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THE DIVINE CONTROLLER ARGUMENT  
FOR INCOMPATIBILISM
Katherin A. Rogers
Incompatibilists hold that, in order for you to be responsible, your choices 
must come from yourself; thus, determinism is incompatible with respon-
sibility. One way of defending this claim is the Controller Argument: You 
are not responsible if your choices are caused by a controller, and natural 
determinism is relevantly similar to such control, therefore . . . Q.E.D. Com-
patibilists dispute both of these premises, insisting upon a relevant dissimi-
larity, or allowing, in a tollens move, that since we can be determined and 
responsible, we can be controlled and responsible. Positing a divine control-
ler strengthens the argument against these two responses.
I. Introduction
Many incompatibilists hold that in order for you to be morally responsible 
such that you might truly deserve praise and blame, reward and punish-
ment, your choices must be free in that they are “up to you” in a robust 
way. You must be able to act “from yourself” (a se) and so you have what 
can be termed aseity.1 They judge that, if determinism is true, then your 
choices are not “up to you” in the right way, and so determinism and 
moral responsibility are incompatible. One recent way of attempting to 
show this is through the “controller” argument.2 In the present paper I 
argue that hypothesizing a divine controller strengthens the argument in 
a number of ways, allowing the defender to respond successfully to the 
two major criticisms advanced against the argument.
The controller argument goes like this: Hypothesize a controller—a 
mad neuroscientist or a megalomaniac behavioral engineer—who causes 
you to choose to do something (X) in such a way that your choice is ne-
cessitated. (In this context “cause” should be understood in a broad, and 
1This is the position defended by Anselm of Canterbury, arguably the first to develop 
a systematic analysis of libertarian freedom. See Katherin Rogers, Anselm on Freedom (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 59–60.
2Recent examples include Robert Kane, who proposes the argument as part of his de-
fense of libertarianism in The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 64–71, and Derk Pereboom, who uses it to bolster a medium-hard determinism in 
“Determinism al Dente,” Nous 29 (1995), 21–45. These arguments have also been called 
“manipulator” arguments, but I will argue that “manipulation” is not the right term to 
describe divine control. 
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stronger than counterfactual, sense. To cause something is to exert some 
force or power to produce an effect. The controller brings it about.) Your 
choice to X comes about in such a way that you could not possibly fail to 
choose to X. And suppose that the controller controls without coercion, 
and you do not even know of his activity. To adopt Robert Kane’s terminol-
ogy, he is a “covert, nonconstraining controller” (CNC).3 You might “feel” 
free, but nonetheless, the argument goes, it is intuitively obvious that you 
cannot be held responsible for the choice to X. Why not? Because some-
one else made you make the choice. But, continues the incompatibilist, 
analysis of the controller hypothesis shows that what precludes your 
having moral responsibility is not so much that there is someone else 
involved in your choice, but that their involvement causally necessitates 
your choice. If your choice is causally necessitated by something other 
than yourself, then you cannot be responsible for it.4 But if determinism 
is true, everything is causally necessitated. Your choices are the inevita-
ble product of something not yourself. So, in a deterministic universe, no 
human choices are free in a sense which can ground moral responsibility.5
In response, the compatibilist who agrees with the initial intuition con-
cerning the controlled agent’s lack of responsibility may reject the claim 
that the causally necessitating factors at work in a deterministic universe 
are the same or relevantly similar to those in the controller scenario, and 
so he can argue that the conclusion need not follow. Alternatively, if the 
compatibilist grants that the controller as cause and the deterministic uni-
verse as cause are the same or relevantly similar he can conclude that the 
original intuition was misleading. Just as we can be free and responsible in 
a determinist universe, we can be free and responsible when our choices 
are caused by a controller. If this leaves us with an intuitive draw, it can be 
argued that the incompatibilist loses, since it was he who proposed the 
controller argument to discredit compatibilism.
Here I run the argument replacing a limited controller with God. This 
move is mentioned in the current literature, but it has not been devel-
oped.6 Positing a divine controller improves the argument in a number 
of ways, one of which deserves mention at the outset. The dispute here 
3Kane, Significance of Free Will, 65. 
4The qualifier “by something other than yourself” is required to take account of situ-
ations in which you have freely and responsibly constructed a situation such that your 
choice is causally necessitated by that situation. In that case we might still hold you re-
sponsible. 
5Nowadays many philosophers allow that determinism is likely to be false, in that there 
is good reason to believe that some things act indeterministically on the subatomic level. 
The determinism that is of interest to us is on the level of middle-sized objects, especially 
human agents, and I shall use the term “determinism” to apply to that level without mean-
ing by it that absolutely all events are determined.
6For example, Derk Pereboom quotes a devoted Calvinist in drawing out and making 
vivid the entailments of insisting that we may be free and blameworthy though controlled 
(“A Hard-line Reply to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument,” Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research 77 [2008], 160–170, see especially 165–167). But he does not make the 
divine controller case the focus of his argument.
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is a battle of intuitions, and it may be relevant that the limited controller, 
the mad neuroscientist or the megalomaniac behavioral engineer are the 
inventions of philosophers to serve a fleeting purpose, while God has a 
history and a following such that He must be taken seriously. The lim-
ited controllers are “thin,” bizarre, and evanescent, which makes them 
suspect as “intuition pumps.” By “thin” I mean that all there is to them is 
their role in the controller argument. They are bizarre figures, so it can be 
argued that their weirdness is doing much of the heavy lifting in eliciting 
the looked-for intuition. And they are evanescent. We do not really have to 
worry about them since they exist only as fanciful hypotheses, safely con-
fined to the pages of philosophical literature. As we do our philosophy, 
we may commit to consequences involving these characters because we 
believe that it is safe to do so. The consequences, like the characters, will 
not “slop over” into “real life.” However, if we—or even just most of our 
forebears and many of our neighbors—believed the controller to exist in 
reality, then we might be more cautious about the conclusions we accept 
regarding the controller scenario.
God, on the other hand, is not “thin.” The concept of God is systematic 
and complex, so intuitions in His regard will not be based solely on a 
narrow role in the controller argument. And, while God may be bizarre 
in the sense that He is a very unusual sort of person, He is nonetheless 
a common and well-known figure in Western thought. And the idea of 
God has an importance that the ideas of the mad neuroscientist and of the 
megalomaniac behavioral engineer do not. Our intuitions regarding the 
God hypothesis are correspondingly likely to be more serious.
II. The Divine Controller Argument
Let us now sketch and then develop the divine controller argument.
1. If God causally necessitates your choice, then you are not morally 
responsible for it.
2. Causal necessitation of your choice due to natural causes in a deter-
ministic universe is relevantly similar to divine causal necessitation.7
Therefore
3. If natural causes in a deterministic universe causally necessitate 
your choice, you are not morally responsible for it.
To defend the first premise, take an example: Say that murder is wrong 
and that God has commanded you not to commit murder on pain of pun-
ishment. (Let us leave Hell out of the hypothesis, since the specter of an 
infinite punishment for a finite crime might affect our intuitions.) Sup-
pose that the punishment involved is a long period of suffering, equiva-
lent to a life sentence without parole—the sort of punishment which is 
7Which is not to say that divine causation is like natural causation. All I need for the 
argument is that both can causally necessitate an effect.
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standard in our society today. And now suppose that God directly causes 
in you a choice to commit murder, which necessitates your subsequently 
committing murder. Do you deserve that God should punish you? Surely 
not! But why not? Because He made you choose to murder! Could our in-
tuition be driven by repugnance at God himself punishing you for what 
He made you do? God is, by hypothesis, perfectly just. If you deserve to 
be punished, He ought to punish you. But allow that the punishment will 
not be done by God, but by human agents. Still, God made you choose, 
and so it seems that you do not deserve to be punished.
Note that the hypothesis does not entail that God Himself has com-
mitted a murder. He has merely caused you to choose and, subsequently, 
to murder. Nor, by hypothesis, has God done anything wrong. Perhaps 
your committing the murder is a necessary part of the larger divine plan 
aimed at some great good which would otherwise be unobtainable. (Kant 
might disapprove of this suggestion, but Augustine and Aquinas both 
make similar claims.) Note also that I associate moral responsibility with 
a strong concept of desert; in order to be morally responsible you must be 
deserving of praise and blame and hence, in the right situations, of reward 
and punishment.8 So in asking whether or not you deserve to be punished, 
we are not asking the broader question of whether or not you ought to 
be punished. Many philosophers uncouple punishment—the inflicting of 
pain and suffering on someone in response to their bad behavior—from 
desert, and do not find the concept of desert compelling.9 If someone does 
not share the intuition that justice entails that the unrepentant evil-doer 
deserves to suffer and the good deserve to be happy, it is difficult to say 
much more to motivate agreement. And perhaps it is this fundamental 
disagreement over desert that in large part drives the debate between 
compatibilists and incompatibilists. All I need here is the intuition that, 
in justice, you do not deserve to be punished for a deed God made you 
do. There may be good reasons to inflict pain and suffering on you, but it 
will not be because you deserve it. If the concept of desert does not find 
a place in your moral landscape such that you have no strong intuitions 
about what agents may or may not deserve, then you will find the divine 
controller argument unmotivated.
And so back to the murder. Perhaps it is good and right that God causes 
you to choose to murder and that we subsequently inflict pain on you. But 
you cannot, in justice, be held responsible for what God made you do. Of 
course, He did not make you do it against your will, but He made you do it 
8Derk Pereboom agrees that this is the understanding of moral responsibility that 
underlies and drives the free will debate. See Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, and Vargas, Four 
Views on Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 86–87, 197–198. He refers to the 
concept in question as basic desert, and does not attempt to justify what he takes to be a 
wide-spread belief in basic desert, which is not surprising since, ultimately, he defends 
hard determinism.
9Daniel Dennett allows that determinism entails that we do not have “in-the-eyes-of-
God” guilt, but that we have enough freedom to be responsible, since punishment will 
affect how we behave; see Elbow Room (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 156–165.
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nonetheless. But why does God’s making you choose conflict with your 
responsibility? The reason is that the decisive causal impetus necessitat-
ing your choice does not come from you, but from God. It is not under 
your control and precedes your choice logically and perhaps temporally.10 
We can develop the divine controller argument a little more:
1. If God causally necessitates your choice, you are not morally re-
sponsible for it because the causal impetus necessitating your choice 
is not under your control and precedes your choice logically and 
perhaps temporally.
2. Causal necessitation of your choice due to natural causes in a deter-
ministic universe is relevantly similar to divine causal necessitation.
Therefore
3. If natural causes in a deterministic universe causally necessitate 
your choice, you are not morally responsible for it.
Compatibilism is false. Q.E.D.
III. Divine Control versus Natural Determinism
The compatibilist will respond that this is far too fast. For one thing, there 
may be a relevant difference between the divine controller and natural 
determinism such that Premise 2 is false and so the conclusion that there 
is no responsibility in a determinist universe can be blocked.11 This is one 
of the critiques Alfred Mele levels against Derk Pereboom’s controller ar-
gument, the four-case manipulation argument. Pereboom presents four 
cases where agents’ choices are determined. He begins with a limited con-
troller case where the controllers directly manipulate an agent’s mental 
processes to produce a given choice. He holds that it is intuitively obvious 
that the controlled agent is not responsible in this case. Then he moves 
progressively through three more cases. The second involves indirect 
control through programming. In the third, control is exercised through 
rigorous training. The fourth results in the same consequences for neces-
sitated choice on the part of the agent as in the third, but the causes are 
natural, not produced by a controller. Pereboom argues that, just as it is 
intuitively obvious in the first case, the three succeeding cases are suf-
ficiently similar that they should elicit the intuition that the agent is not 
responsible, and this includes case four, where natural causes produce the 
agent’s choice in the determinist universe.
10Classical theists may want to make the Anselmian move, which holds that the motive 
power for your free choice comes from God, but the opting for this over that comes from 
you. See Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 117–121.
11Bernard Berofsky, “Global Control and Freedom,” Philosophical Studies 131 (2006), 
419–445; David Blumenfeld, “Freedom and Mind Control,” American Philosophical Quarterly 
25 (1988), 215–227; Bruce Waller, “Free Will Gone Out of Control,” Behaviorism 16 (1988), 
149–157; and Gary Watson, “Free Action and Free Will,” Mind 96 (1987), 145–172. 
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Mele counters that it may not be the hypothesis of determinism that 
elicits the intuition that the agents in the four cases are not responsible. 
He argues that we can construct cases analogous to Pereboom’s 1 and 2 
where there is indeterminism in the process of control and yet our intu-
ition regarding the agent’s lack of responsibility remains unchanged. Thus 
it is not the causal determination that elicits the intuition.12 He writes, 
“for all Pereboom has shown, it is the manipulation, not the deterministic 
causation, that does the intuition-driving work in his cases.”13 Pereboom, 
in turn, responds that what Mele’s analogous cases likely show is that 
“determinism nevertheless explains [the agent’s] non-responsibility in 
[Pereboom’s] Case 2, while a deeper fact, such as the presence of causal 
circumstances that precludes responsibility-relevant control, explains his 
non-responsibility in both [the original and Mele’s analogous] cases.”14
Mele does not try to pinpoint exactly what the relevant difference be-
tween the manipulator and natural determinism is. I will argue that the 
possibly relevant differences between a limited controller and the deter-
minist universe disappear when the controller at issue is God. So what 
might the relevant differences be? In the limited controller case in which 
the mad scientist causes your choice, especially if it is a choice to do some-
thing wrong, we might hold that there is something morally wicked, or at 
least suspect, in the controller’s behavior. And couldn’t the presence of a 
blameworthy agent—other than you—in the history of your choice, drive 
our intuition that you should not be held responsible? With the limited 
controller this point has traction. We have, after all, hypothesized a mad 
scientist or a megalomaniac behavioral engineer. History demonstrates that 
when mere mortals put themselves in loco divinitatis and attempt to control 
their fellows, things go badly for the would-be controlled. Perhaps these 
thoughts form part of the background of our intuition that the controlled 
agent is not free. And since natural causes in a determinist universe can-
not be accused of moral turpitude, we have reason to believe that the 
causation exercised by the controller is relevantly different from the natu-
ral causes at work in a determinist universe. But with the divine controller 
what drives the intuition cannot be moral qualms about the behavior of 
the controller. God is necessarily good, so our unwillingness to ascribe 
moral responsibility to you when God causes you to choose to murder 
cannot arise from our holding that God has behaved badly and so must 
bear all, most, or at least some, of the responsibility.
Nonetheless we may hold that, even if we have to allow the controller’s 
goodness ex hypothesi, you are still being used by another agent, and it is re-
sentment at the thought of being used that drives our intuition that you are 
not responsible in the divine controller case. The deterministic universe has 
12Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 138–144.
13Ibid., 144.
14Derk Pereboom, “On Free Will and Luck,” Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007), 163–172, 
see 170. 
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no purposes, so it is not using us and the situation is relevantly different. But 
we can alter the divine controller case to ensure that you are not being used 
in ways you could properly resent. We could say that, before God causes 
your choice to murder, he shows you his plan, and you, seeing the benefits 
that will ultimately be produced by your crime and punishment, agree to 
allow him to cause the choice. (If your agreement is not freely given we may 
be opening the way for an infinite regress, so perhaps we could add here 
that God has bestowed on you an ability to make a libertarian free choice 
for just long enough for you to choose to agree that God should cause you 
to make the choice to murder.) Then he erases your memory and causes the 
choice—but you agreed to it, so you are not really being used.15
Or suppose—contrary to the fact, alas—that God had made our world 
one in which good deeds are rewarded with earthly benefits. Now God, to 
achieve some purpose of his own, causes you to do something extremely 
good for which he ensures that you reap the significant reward. Maybe 
you win the lottery for six million dollars and live a long, healthy, hap-
py life, dying peacefully in bed surrounded by friends and loved ones. 
I would hold that, intuitively, you do not deserve your good fortune. You 
just did what God made you do, and if he’d made me do the good deed, I’d 
be the rich and happy one. It seems to me that the same conclusion about 
desert would follow if we posit that it is the deterministic universe, rather 
than God, that has made you do the good thing. Since you were made to 
do the good deed, you don’t really deserve any reward. In this case we 
cannot point to a difference between the divine and the natural controller 
based on the premise that you resent being used by the divine controller. 
You’re happy as a clam, and it would be odd for you to resent it!
Still, someone might argue that, whether or not you agreed to it, or re-
sent it, in both of these examples you are still an instrument in the divine 
plan. You are being used for a purpose and that indicates an ineradicable 
difference between the divine controller and the deterministic universe. 
So change the example just a little more. God causes you to choose to 
murder (or to do the extremely good deed) for no reason at all. There is 
no plan or purpose. Those unfamiliar with the history of western the-
ism might suppose that a God who wills something without their being 
a good reason for it is a fanciful invention, kin to the mad neuroscientist 
and the megalomaniacal behavioral engineer. But no. There is a major 
strand in the philosophy of religion, going back at least to Alghazali in the 
eleventh century and ably represented by William of Ockham, that insists 
upon the primacy of the divine will, even above the divine intellect. God, 
15I grant that this is an odd case. Could we argue that, since you agreed to have it caused 
in you, you are responsible for the choice to murder? But the situation we have envisioned 
is one in which the choice to murder, if it is a responsible choice, is blameworthy. Are you 
properly blamed for the murder and simultaneously properly praised for agreeing to have 
the choice to murder caused in you and so to suffer as an instrument of the divine plan? 
For a similar, but even stranger, suggestion see Alvin Plantinga, “Supralapsarianism, or ‘O 
Felix Culpa’” in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, ed. Peter van Inwagen (Grand Rapids, 
MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004), 1–25.
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according to this school of thought, is unqualifiedly free to choose any-
thing logically possible. The Good is whatever God should choose. Thus 
his will is necessarily “good” and is not constrained by anything. He may 
cause a choice in a created agent without this being “in order to” achieve 
anything. He just causes it. So the created agent is not being used as a 
means to an end any more than if his choice were caused for no purpose 
by a deterministic universe.16
So we cannot ascribe morally doubtful qualities to the divine controller, 
and we can construct scenarios in which the controlled agent is not being 
used. Still, isn’t there, in the controller scenario, whether we are talking 
about a limited or a divine controller, an inevitable element of intervention, 
of manipulation, by the controller, which is just not there in the determin-
istic universe? With the limited controller it would seem that some sort of 
intervention or manipulation would have to be part of the scenario, but 
not necessarily with the divine controller. Intervention and manipulation, 
I take it, imply that the controlled agent exists independently of the con-
troller such that the controller must “step in” and tinker with the agent. 
Someone who intervenes or manipulates introduces changes which turn 
the agent from the path he likely would have followed. If we take our 
divine controller to be the God of classical theism—of Thomas Aquinas, 
as the prime example—then complete divine control does not entail any 
intervening per se. Classical theism holds that God’s creation consists in 
sustaining everything in being from moment to moment. Absolutely ev-
ery created thing that has any ontological status is immediately caused 
by God simultaneously with its existence.17 Thus nothing which is not 
God—no object, no positive property, no action—exists independently of 
God’s directly causing it.18
This is not to deny the sorts of causes that science describes. The causal 
connections we observe in nature are real and play the explanatory role 
which science ascribes to them. To pick a standard medieval example, we 
can observe fire burning cotton. If we then ask, “What caused the cotton 
to burn?,” the correct answer is “the fire.” But all of the objects with their 
properties and their behavior—the whole system of cause and effect—is 
kept in being immediately by God. In the parlance of Thomas’s day, God 
is the primary cause and the natural causes are secondary causes; sec-
ondary not in any temporal sense, but in the hierarchical sense that they 
16It could be claimed that the divinely controlled agent is different from the agent in 
the deterministic universe because he has been uniquely “singled out.” His choices are 
not caused in the “normal” way. That is easily answered by hypothesizing that every non-
divine agent is a divinely controlled agent.
17Thomas would take it that a metaphysics in which a cause must, by definition, precede 
its effect temporally is deeply misguided.
18Even the laws of logic and mathematics do not exist independently of God, but rather 
are reflections of his nature as necessary being. Something might rightly be said to have the 
property of “being evil,” but evil per se is an absence or lack of what ought to be there, and 
so “being evil” is not a positive property. On this view God could be said to cause an evil 
choice, without his being the cause of evil per se.
THE DIVINE CONTROLLER ARGUMENT FOR INCOMPATIBILISM 283
are dependent upon God for their existence. What caused the cotton to 
burn? The fire as the secondary cause and God as the primary cause. But 
God did not “intervene” or “manipulate” either the fire or the cotton. He 
simply caused them to exist as what they are with all their properties and 
behavior. So we can hypothesize a God who is sustaining everything in 
being from moment to moment, even you with your choices and subse-
quent actions.19 (This does not rule out the possibility of God producing 
unlooked-for effects—miracles. But in order to counter the “intervener” 
point all we need is an instance of God causing your choice in a way that 
does not suggest that you exist independently of God such that He inter-
feres as a limited controller would have to do.20) So, while God may be a 
complete divine controller, He need not be a manipulator or intervener. In 
the divine controller argument your lack of responsibility for the choice to 
murder cannot be ascribed to your having been mistreated, used, or even 
simply manipulated, by the controller.
Could it be that our intuition about the controller is really rooted in the 
simple fact that we resent conforming to what someone else wants us to 
do? Surely not. In the course of our lives we do many, many things that 
other people want us to do. It would be bizarre to suggest that that alone 
interferes with moral responsibility. Suppose there is an ideal observer 
who, without causing you to do anything, observes everything you do. 
And suppose it turns out that everything you do is just what the ideal 
observer wants you to do. There is no element in this picture to vitiate 
your moral responsibility. Nor can your lack of responsibility be ascribed 
to the divine controller knowing ahead of time what you will choose. Di-
vine foreknowledge does not translate into divine, or any other sort, of 
problematic necessitation of the foreknown. In fact it can be reconciled 
with our choices being “up to us” in the sense requisite for libertarian 
freedom.21 What is worrisome in the controller scenario is not that some-
one wants us to do something, or that someone might know beforehand 
19I would consider Thomas a compatibilist, in that he holds that, while our choices 
are caused by something other than ourselves—God as primary cause—we are still re-
sponsible. Of course, our choices are also caused by us, as secondary causes. See Summa 
Theologiae 1, Q.83, art.1, ad.3 and Summa Contra Gentiles 1:68. Brian Shanley, O.P., argues 
that, since the divine causation in question is not the temporally antecedent natural cau-
sation posited by contemporary determinism, it is better not to label Thomas a compati-
bilist (“Beyond Libertarianism and Compatibilism: Thomas Aquinas on Created Free-
dom,” in Freedom and the Human Person, ed. Richard Velkley [Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2007], 70–89). Hugh McCann has recently proposed a view 
very close to Thomas’s. See “Divine Sovereignty and the Freedom of the Will,” Faith and 
Philosophy 12 (1995), 582–598; “Sovereignty and Freedom: A Reply to Rowe,” Faith and 
Philosophy 18 (2001), 110–116; and “The Author of Sin?,” Faith and Philosophy 22 (2005), 
144–159. In response see Katherin Rogers, “Does God Cause Sin? Anselm of Canter-
bury versus Jonathan Edwards on Human Freedom and Divine Sovereignty,” Faith and 
Philosophy 20 (2003), 371–378 and “God is not the Author of Sin,” Faith and Philosophy 24 
(2007), 300–310. 
20This is the thesis of Hugh McCann, “Divine Sovereignty and the Freedom of the Will.”
21See Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, chaps. 8 and 9.
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that we will do something. That leaves the worry that someone makes us 
do something.
Taking a cue from Pereboom’s progressive, four-case argument, I pro-
pose that our intuition about moral responsibility should stay the same 
as we hypothesize a divine controller whose causal activity is mediated 
and so comes to look more and more like that at work in a determinist 
universe. Suppose, in a departure from classical theism, that God sustains 
the world in being from moment to moment indirectly by immediately 
causing an angelic intelligence which, in turn, causes and sustains ev-
erything that is not God or the angel. God is immediately sustaining this 
angelic intelligence in being, and causing it to cause everything else that 
there is, including you and your choice to murder. (Note that there is still 
no question of intervention or manipulation since you do not exist inde-
pendently.) So your choice is caused directly by the angelic intelligence 
and only indirectly by God. Do you now deserve to be punished? But there 
is no important difference here between the divine controller simpliciter, 
and the divine controller causing through the divinely controlled angelic 
controller, is there? Your choice is not “up to you.” It is still up to God, but 
at one remove. Adding a chain of angels, a multi-tiered hierarchy of simul-
taneous angelic causes, would not add anything in which your aseity, and 
hence your moral responsibility, could be grounded. Nor would replacing 
the angelic intelligence with a mechanistic cause or chain of causes. If 
God creates a machine which makes you along with your choice, or which 
makes another machine which makes you, there has been no element ei-
ther added or subtracted to produce the sort of new situation in which 
your moral responsibility can be grounded.
Suppose, instead of simultaneous causal activity, we hypothesize that 
the divine controller—now quite distant from the God of classical the-
ism—operates through a temporally successive series of causes, starting 
before your conception, which brings you and, later, your subsequent 
choice, into being. Again, there seems to be nothing in this picture which 
should change our original assessment. If your choice is caused by God, 
you are not responsible for it. Finally, take the above suggestion one step 
further. Suppose that God should arrange all the necessitating causes for 
you and your choice to murder within the initial singularity, should light 
the fuse for the Big Bang, and then, per impossibile, should blink out of 
being. Now the determining chain of natural causes unfolds following 
the divine plan but without immediate divine guidance up to the point 
where you choose to murder and commit the murder. Now do you deserve 
to be punished? I do not see that, with the point that God is the ultimate 
cause of your choice remaining the same, the absence of God at the time 
you come to trial injects anything into (or subtracts anything from) the 
situation sufficient to ground your aseity and moral responsibility.
And if it is the fact that we are made to do something that conflicts 
with our having genuine aseity and moral responsibility, then it is dif-
ficult to see the relevant difference between someone doing the making 
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and something such as the causes at work in a deterministic universe.22 
There seems to be nothing relevant to distinguish our final hypothetical 
universe where God arranges everything and then disappears leaving the 
chain of causes to unfold and the deterministic universe without God in 
its pre-history. If you are not responsible for the choice to murder in the 
former, then you are not responsible in the latter. If an agent who is di-
vinely controlled is not morally responsible, then an agent whose choices 
are caused by a deterministic universe is not morally responsible.
IV. A Tollens Response?
The compatibilist may agree with that last proposition, but negate the 
consequent. That is, he may believe that Premise 2 in the divine controller 
argument is true, but that Premise 1 is false. And he can argue his point 
by running a sort of tollens version of the divine controller argument.
1*. Even if natural causes in a deterministic universe causally necessi-
tate your choice, you may nonetheless be morally responsible for it.
2. Causal necessitation of your choice due to natural causes in a deter-
ministic universe is relevantly similar to divine causal necessitation.
Therefore
3*. Even if God causally necessitates your choice, you may nonetheless 
be morally responsible for it.
Call this the “tollens” argument.
According to the compatibilist, you can be responsible even in a deter-
ministic universe, assuming you meet the criteria for responsibility pro-
posed by the compatibilist. So the compatibilist can hold that if Premise 
2 is true, it follows that you can be responsible although divinely con-
trolled, again assuming you meet the proper criteria. The compatibilist 
may allow that neither the incompatibilist’s divine controller argument 
nor his own tollens argument can be shown to have more intuitive pow-
er or argumentative support than its rival. And so the discussion over 
which argument is more plausible ends in a draw. But in that case, it could 
be argued, the compatibilist wins, since it was the incompatibilist who 
proposed the controller argument in order to show that compatibilism 
is mistaken.23
22Perhaps the critic might point to the fact that the controller is one thing while “the 
causes at work in the deterministic universe” are many and complex (Marius Usher, “Con-
trol, Choice, and the Convergence/Divergence Dynamics: A Compatibilistic Probabilistic 
Theory of Free Will,” The Journal of Philosophy 103 [2006], 188–213, see 210–213). But it is not 
clear what sort of relevant distinction could be drawn from this. In any case, the defender 
of the divine controller argument could construct a scenario in which God introduces all 
sorts of complex causes in addition to his act of primary causation.
23Michael McKenna, “A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argu-
ment,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2008), 142–159.
286 Faith and Philosophy
But this is a bit hasty. There is an asymmetry between the divine con-
troller and the tollens arguments.24 The premise in the divine controller 
argument says that if God causes your choice you are not morally respon-
sible. So, for example, it just isn’t fair for God, or anyone, to punish you for 
a murder that God caused you to choose and commit. I take this to be an 
intuitive claim which is immediate (you see it as soon as you understand 
the terms), powerful, and widely accepted. This intuitive strength is taken 
to provide strong prima facie reason to accept the claim. The premise in 
the tollens argument—although you are determined you can be morally 
responsible—certainly cannot lay claim to that sort of intuitive support. 
To be plausible at all, it must assume a fairly sophisticated form of com-
patibilism. Among compatibilists there are many different views on what 
the proper criteria for moral responsibility are. Each view has its adher-
ents, but they are comparatively few, being drawn from the already small 
pool of those who study metaphysics. And they were brought to their con-
clusion by lengthy argument, often beginning with dissatisfaction with 
libertarianism, not by some immediate “seeing” that it must be the case. 
The premise in the tollens argument does not have the prima facie intuitive 
strength that the premise in the divine controller argument does. That 
means that when we arrive at the intuitively difficult conclusion that we 
are morally responsible—we deserve to be punished or rewarded—even if our 
choices are caused by God, our reason to accept the conclusion, rather 
than rejecting the premise, is comparatively weak.
The compatibilist could argue that if we limit our “intuition pool” to 
those who are educated about the issues, Premise 1* in the tollens argu-
ment might have significant appeal based on accepting the truth of the 
conjunction of two claims; (a) we are free and responsible and (b) indeter-
minist accounts of choice cannot successfully ground our freedom and re-
sponsibility. So, if we are indeed free and responsible, it must be possible 
for us to be free and responsible on a determinist view.25 Claim (a) does 
seem intuitively powerful and widespread. Can (b) make the same boast? 
Presumably, accepting (b) would be based on having rejected attempts to 
construct indeterminist accounts of free and responsible action. Robert 
Kane, for example, has proposed a libertarian analysis of free will which 
involves sophisticated and plausible responses to claim (b).26 Upon long 
and careful study, some might, I suppose, decide that Kane’s arguments, 
and similar efforts along those lines, fail. And some might go even further 
and conclude that future attempts at a successful libertarian account are 
doomed. It would take a lot of study, then, to conclude that claim (b) is 
justified. Thus, unless we draw the circle of the “educated” to ensure the 
24Derk Pereboom, “A Hard-line Reply,” makes a somewhat similar point, but the case 
can be made more forcefully in the context of the divine controller argument.
25Mele, Free Will and Luck, as a “reflective agnostic” offers a tentative suggestion along 
these lines, 191.
26Robert Kane, “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance,” Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999), 217–
240.
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result, it seems wildly improbably that “you are determined yet free and 
responsible” has the same intuitive force as “you don’t deserve to be pun-
ished for what God made you do.”
I stand by the claim that there is an asymmetry between the first prem-
ises of the divine controller and the tollens arguments. And this asym-
metry entails a burden of proof on the compatibilist to strengthen the 
premise in the tollens argument or else show that the conclusion is not as 
difficult as it intuitively appears at first. And here the contemporary com-
patibilist may well insist that he has in fact been hard at work doing both 
of these things at once. Much of the thrust of contemporary compatibilism 
has been aimed at responding to the libertarian’s traditional claim, the 
claim that I take to support the original intuition in the controller case: in 
order for us to be morally responsible, our choices must be “up to us” in 
the right way. Contemporary compatibilists propose criteria which would 
ground the claim that a determined agent could be morally responsible, 
making determined choices which are nonetheless properly from him-
self, a se. To the extent that their theories are attractive, the premise in the 
tollens argument is strengthened, and the power of the original intuition 
driving the divine controller argument is vitiated to the point where, as 
the tollens argument concludes, we should allow that divine causation of 
your choice does not conflict with your freedom. However, it is my con-
tention that contemporary compatibilist theories fail to do the job, leaving 
the tollens move ultimately unsuccessful.
V. Two Examples of the Tollens Move
In defense of my contention, I look briefly at two recent compatibilist the-
ories, one proposed by Lynne Rudder Baker and the other by Alfred Mele, 
both of which explicitly raise the controller argument and make the tollens 
move. My responses to these two positions can, I think, be applied with 
similar effect against other compatibilist views, mutatis mutandis.
Baker endorses Frankfurt’s account wherein harmony between one’s 
first- and second-order desires and volitions plays a crucial role in one’s 
having real freedom. But on Frankfurt’s account, the harmony is sufficient 
for moral responsibility, which leaves the view open to attack from the 
controller argument. If the mad neuroscientist (Baker’s preferred control-
ler) produces your first-order desires, and also produces the second-order 
desires by which you embrace and identify with your first-order desires, 
it seems very odd to hold you free and responsible. Baker argues that 
Frankfurt’s account can be shielded from the controller problem with the 
additional criterion that the responsible agent must reflectively endorse 
the beliefs and desires on which he acts. The idea is roughly this: Suppose 
an agent could know that the desires and beliefs which have produced her 
wanting to will X were produced by causal factors beyond her control. If, 
with this knowledge, the agent would still have “willed X, and wanted 
to will X and willed X because she* wanted to will X,” then we should 
consider her responsible. (The “*” follows “she” to indicate the desires and 
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beliefs to be from a first-person perspective.)27 Baker writes, “If I can say, 
‘These desires reflect who I am, and this is the kind of person that I want 
to be,’ then (surely!) I am morally responsible for acting on those desires—
whether determinism is true or not.”28
Baker argues that the Reflective-Endorsement view does not succumb 
to the controller argument. First, in order to be morally responsible, a 
being must have a first-person perspective, but the mad neuroscientist, 
in Baker’s view, cannot supply the agent with a first-person perspective 
through brain manipulation. This point fails against the divine controller 
argument, since God can create someone with a first-person perspective 
without any “manipulation” at all. Baker goes on to argue that, for some-
one who already has a first-person perspective, if , knowing that his want-
ing to will X is the effect of the mad neuroscientist, he would repudiate 
willing X, then he would not be responsible for willing X. If, with the same 
knowledge, he would still want to will X, then he would be responsible.
Baker notes that the incompatibilist might push the controller argu-
ment another step and posit that the mad neuroscientist is the cause of the 
informed agent’s still wanting to will X and adds a completeness clause, 
“There is no further knowledge of the circumstances of the agent’s en-
dorsement of his willing X that would lead the agent to repudiate his 
endorsement of his willing X.” An agent who would repudiate wanting to 
will X if he knew that the neuroscientist was the source of his not repudi-
ating it is not responsible for willing X. An agent who would still want to 
will X is responsible.
Apply Baker’s analysis to the example I used in the divine controller 
argument: God causes you to choose to murder. He causes in you a first-
order volition to murder, and He causes in you a second-order volition to 
desire to murder. He causes you such that you embrace and identify with 
your willing to murder. At this point in the example, if we ask whether 
or not you deserve to be punished, I take it that most of us still share the 
original intuition—of course not! Now add Baker’s Reflective-Endorse-
ment criterion. God makes you such that, if you knew that He is the cause 
of your endorsing your willing to murder, you would nonetheless remain 
steadfast in endorsing your willing to murder. Add that God is the cause 
of your nonetheless remaining steadfast, and include the completeness 
point—God makes you such that, if you had complete knowledge of the 
causes of your willing to murder, and you knew that He is the cause of 
your nonetheless remaining steadfast in your desire, you would still en-
dorse your willing to murder. On Baker’s account, although the first- and 
second-order volitions and the reflective endorsing are all caused by God, 
you meet the criteria for responsibility. It is just to punish you for the 
murder. Thus, even if your choice is caused by a deterministic universe, 
27Lynne Rudder Baker, “Moral Responsibility without Libertarianism,” Nous 40 (2006), 
307–330, see 316–317. 
28Ibid., 318.
THE DIVINE CONTROLLER ARGUMENT FOR INCOMPATIBILISM 289
you are responsible, and so, assuming you meet the criteria, you can be 
responsible even when God causes your choice.
The incompatibilist is likely to remain unmoved. The reason for saying 
that you are not responsible when God causes your choices was that your 
choices did not originate with you. Baker has added a number of criteria, 
but, once they are spelled out within the divine controller argument, it is 
clear that they do not contribute anything at all towards securing aseity 
for the agent. They do not add or subtract anything which should make 
us change our minds regarding the original intuition. If, as the intuition 
holds, I am not free and responsible when God directly makes me choose 
X, then I am not free and responsible when God directly makes me want 
to choose X even though I know everything there is to know about how 
He has made me want to choose X. But if neither of these actions on my 
part is free, it seems unlikely that their conjunction would be free. So I 
am not free and responsible when He directly makes me to choose X and 
directly makes me want to choose X even though I know everything there 
is to know about how He has made me want to choose X. Contrary to 
Baker’s claim, if I can say, “These desires reflect who [God has made me 
to be], and this is the kind of person that [God has made me] want to be,” 
then (surely!) I am [not!] morally responsible for acting on these desires—
[God being the author of all].
Or take, as a different example, the complex analysis of autonomy which 
Alfred Mele offers in his 1995 Autonomous Agents. He holds that an agent 
who meets his proposed criteria may be free and responsible even if deter-
mined, and he explicitly addresses the controller argument. Mele explains 
that to be psychologically autonomous one must first be an “ideally self-
controlled agent.” That is (to offer a very sketchy outline) one must meet 
four criteria: (1) One must have self-control which ranges across all the rel-
evant categories—overt actions, mental actions, intentions, beliefs, etc. etc. 
(2) One must exercise self-control, not errantly, but in support of decisive 
better judgments, values, etc. etc. (3) One must exercise self-control when-
ever one reflectively deems it appropriate, and (4) The exercises of self-con-
trol “always succeed in supporting what they are aimed at supporting.”29 
In addition to being an ideally self-controlled agent, the psychologically au-
tonomous agent must meet three more conditions, the “compatibilist trio”:
1. The agent has no compelled* motivational states, nor any coercively 
produced motivational states.30
2. The agent’s beliefs are conducive to informed deliberation about all 
matters that concern him.
3. The agent is a reliable deliberator.31
29Alfred Mele, Autonomous Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 121.
30The asterisk indicates compulsion not arranged by the agent. Ibid., 166.
31Ibid., 187.
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Note that meeting these criteria enables the autonomous agent to eval-
uate his values and “shed” them should he find sufficient reason to do so. 
This is an ability which Mele holds to be central to autonomy.32
In responding to the challenge posed by Kane’s covert nonconstrain-
ing controller (CNC), Mele argues that his psychologically autonomous 
agent could not suffer such control since the controller must operate 
through control of the victim’s motivational attitudes, as in brainwashing, 
or through control of the victim’s informational attitudes, as in deceit, or 
through control of the victim’s executive qualities, as in covert condition-
ing. But the victim of such control would not satisfy the compatibilist trio. 
Mele grants that the victim of CNC is not free, but holds that an agent 
produced by natural causes might be determined, and yet still meet the 
criteria. The controller argument fails because the causes inherent in the 
controller scenario are sufficiently different from the causes at work in 
a deterministic universe to allow us to deny autonomy to the controlled 
agent in the former, yet still grant it to the determined agent in the latter.33
This response to the controller argument does not work when we posit 
a divine controller. We can change the hypothesis so that God causes you 
with your choice to murder and causes you in such a way that you meet 
every one of Mele’s criteria. God causes you as a person capable of evalu-
ating and possibly shedding your values. He causes you to be ideally self-
controlled. He causes your properly formed motivational states. There 
is no compulsion. (Compulsion, for Mele, means, in addition to literal, 
physical force, the sort of state induced by irresistible desire, such as drug 
addiction.34 But there is nothing like that here.) God causes the required 
sort of belief formation and the subsequent beliefs. And He causes the 
reliable deliberations which lead you to the choice to murder—which He 
causes as well.
Mele addresses a similar supposition, hypothesizing a creator who cre-
ates an adult agent with all of the requisites for autonomy. He concludes, 
making the tollens move, that someone whose choices are caused by (his 
analogue of) a divine controller in such a way that his criteria for auton-
omy are met is indeed autonomous.35 More recently, Mele has introduced 
a somewhat different controller argument, the “zygote” argument. This 
argument is rather like my penultimate development of the divine con-
troller argument in which God causes your choice through a temporal 
sequence of natural, necessitating causes. I held that, since there was no 
change as regards your aseity from the initial case in which God simply 
causes your choice immediately, we should not change our view that you 
are not responsible. In Mele’s argument the motivating example is this: 
32Ibid., 153, 190.
33Ibid., 187–189.
34Ibid., 136–137.
35Ibid., 190. His version is most like my case where God arranges everything at the Big 
Bang.
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Diana creates a zygote, Z, in Mary because she wants event E to occur 
thirty years later. Diana is in a determinist universe and knows what the 
state of the universe is right before she creates Z and what the laws of 
nature are. She deduces that Z will develop into an agent, Ernie, who will 
A and thus bring about E in thirty years. Ernie has all of the attributes 
and engages in all of the processes Mele takes to satisfy a compatibilist 
account of sufficient conditions for A-ing freely. Analogous to the divine 
controller argument, the first premise of the zygote argument states that 
Ernie is not a free and responsible agent. The second premise notes that 
“there is no significant difference between the way Ernie’s zygote comes 
to exist and the way any normal human zygote comes to exist in a de-
terministic universe.” And the conclusion is that “determinism precludes 
free action and moral responsibility.”36
Mele holds that, given the point mentioned above that many of the 
educated have serious doubts about the possibility of free and respon-
sible action on the part of agents making indetermined choices, one might 
intuitively reject the first premise of the zygote argument. In that case, 
Ernie may be free and responsible even though Diana has created him 
through his zygote such that he will A to effect E. Mele says that he is 
himself agnostic and notes that many factors drive intuitions. For exam-
ple, if A is a praiseworthy action we may be more likely to hold Ernie 
responsible than if it is a blameworthy one.37 In response, I grant that our 
intuitions are inexact and can mislead, but casting the example within 
the divine controller argument simplifies the elements involved and clari-
fies the situation. As I suggested above, it seems clear that if you do what 
you do because God makes you do it, you are not responsible. If you do 
evil, you do not deserve the blame and punishment, and if you do good, 
you do not deserve the praise and reward. There is relevant symmetry 
involved in God making you do the evil or the good in that in neither case 
do you choose a se. In both cases the decisive causal impetus for the choice 
is from God and not from you. And given that symmetry, there should be 
no asymmetry in our views about your deserts.38
Pursuing the question of what might affect our intuitions, Mele goes 
on to suggest that one’s view of the nature of causation may be relevant. 
Suppose Diana and Ernie inhabit a universe with Humean causation. 
There is no causal necessitation at work, but only regularities. (Or, if you 
take the Humean theory to be epistemic rather than metaphysical, there 
is no knowable causal necessitation. For our purposes either interpreta-
tion grounds the same problem.) The “laws” cannot actually be known 
until the universe has ended, since only then can it be ascertained what 
36Mele, Free Will and Luck, 188–189.
37Ibid., 193.
38This point counts tellingly against views such as Susan Wolf’s (Freedom within Reason), 
which hold that the determined agent who chooses well is responsible, while the deter-
mined agent who chooses badly is not.
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regularities occurred consistently, if any. It is in part Ernie’s doing A that 
brings about the “laws.” Diana cannot ensure that Ernie will do A even 
with her perfect knowledge of the state of the universe before she makes 
Z. Unless she knows all the future she cannot know the “laws,” and, in 
any case, whatever is involved in her (supposed) creation of Z, there is no 
(known) causal necessity that Z will grow into Ernie or that Ernie will A, 
since there is no (known) causal necessity at all. If Z grows into Ernie, and 
Ernie A’s, it will not be due (or cannot be known to be due) to Diana’s efforts. 
Mele suggests that doubts about the possibility of ours being a Humean 
universe might lead one to deny the force of the zygote argument.39
I would go a step further and argue that, on a Humean analysis of cau-
sation, no version of the controller argument can get off the ground. There 
are many versions and interpretations of Humeanism, but standardly the 
view involves at least two core commitments: (1) The observed fact that 
events of type Q have consistently followed events of type P does not 
justify the claim that events of type Q occur because of events of type P. 
A constant conjunction does not justify asserting a necessary causal con-
nection. We are not in a position to assert any necessary causal connec-
tions at all. (2) For all we know, if an event of type P occurs in the future, 
it will not be followed by an event of type Q. Indeed, we cannot make 
any justified claims about what the future will hold. But the controller 
argument hypothesizes that the controller can control, that the controller 
causes, the agent to make some choice. In a Humean universe, assuming 
we are talking about a limited “controller” who operates within the physi-
cal system, we are never justified in claiming that the controller controls. 
This is true even of the mad neurosurgeon who (supposedly) directly acts 
on the brain of the would-be controlled. As with Mele’s case of Diana, if 
the controller pushes the button which he supposes to cause choice X in 
the agent, and the agent then chooses X, we are not justified in asserting 
that the controller produced the choice to X in the agent. At the most, if we 
knew the entire history of the universe, we might be able to claim a regu-
larity. But that is not control. The very hypothesis of a limited controller is 
at odds with a Humean analysis of causation.
What about a divine controller who transcends the universe of Hu-
mean causation? There have been theists who argued for a divine con-
troller operating on a Humean universe. Alghazali, the famous Muslim 
fideist, gives roughly the reasons Hume gives for skepticism about causa-
tion between the objects and events in the physical universe. He comes to 
the conclusion that God is the immediate cause of everything that hap-
pens and there are no causal connections between objects and events. On 
this occasionalist view, we could (and do!) hypothesize a God who causes 
your choices. The problem is that, in the occasionalist universe, Premise 
2 of the divine controller argument is just false. Divine causation, where 
39Mele, Free Will and Luck, 194. See also, Helen Beebee and Alfred Mele, “Humean Com-
patibilism,” Mind 111 (2002), 201–224. 
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God brings things about, is not relevantly like causation in the natural 
universe, since there is no “bringing about” sort of causation in the natu-
ral universe. At most, there are only regularities.
The controller argument depends upon assuming a necessitarian anal-
ysis of causation—or, at least, a non-Humean analysis. It requires the as-
sumption that causes, divine or natural, bring about effects. The Humean 
has more against the zygote argument than just intuitive doubts about the 
first premise. Diana’s actions do not (to our knowledge) produce Z, so the 
initial hypothesis conflicts with a Humean universe. The second premise 
holds that “there is no significant difference between the way Ernie’s zy-
gote comes to exist and the way any normal human zygote comes to exist 
in a deterministic universe.” But in a Humean universe we are justified in 
making claims neither about how Z came into being nor about how nor-
mal human zygotes come into being. (Even on the level of observed reg-
ularities, how many normal zygotes have you seen coming into being?) 
The Humean, then, should not allow the second premise or the original 
Diana-maker-of-Z thought experiment. Mele’s point regarding the effect 
of Humeanism on one’s intuitive response to the first premise seems to 
miss the mark. The Humean is not in a position to make the tollens argu-
ment in response to the divine controller argument.40
The compatibilist who pushes the tollens argument and so denies the 
first premise of the divine controller argument had better do so on the 
basis of a plausible version of compatibilism which provides the agent 
with the requisites for freedom even in a (necessitarian) determined uni-
verse. I take it this is exactly what compatibilists like Mele (or “possible 
compatibilists” since he says he is an agnostic?) attempt to do. But in the 
original divine controller argument the claim was that you are not re-
sponsible because God made you to choose what you choose and your 
choice did not originate with you. If, in a determinist universe, you are 
made to choose what you choose and your choice does not originate with 
you, then you are similarly not responsible. Mele’s addition of his purport-
edly “autonomy-making” properties does not address that conclusion. If 
we have qualms about your responsibility when God causes your choice, 
why should they be alleviated when God causes your deliberating and 
then causes your choice? With the addition of Mele’s criteria to the agent 
in the divine controller example, you are simply doing more things— 
exercising self-control, deliberating, shedding values, etc.,—that God 
makes you do.41 If it seemed unjust that you be punished for a murder 
40It is not surprising that a Humean view of causation has not played a role in the free 
will debate. Presumably, as we discuss the cluster of relevant questions, we must suppose 
that your choices cause your actions, that you are recognizably the same person over time, 
that all sorts of facts about you and the world influence how you choose, that we will not, in 
the next five minutes, all turn into toads with wings. Take recognizable causal connections 
out of the picture and all bets are off.
41Dennett, Elbow Room, asks us to consider, rather than the demonic neuroscientist, the 
“eloquent philosopher who indirectly manipulates a person’s brain” through persuasive 
reasons (64–65). If God causes you to choose to murder through causing your mental states 
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God made you choose to commit, it seems equally unjust that you be pun-
ished when God causes you to choose to murder and causes you to do all 
sorts of other things which function as secondary causes, causing you 
to murder. It seems implausible to hold that you are not responsible for 
doing X when God directly causes you to do X and only X, but you are re-
sponsible for doing X when God directly causes you do to X and Y and Z.
Our question was whether or not contemporary compatibilists could 
produce an intuitively powerful tollens argument against the divine con-
troller argument, thus defeating the incompatibilist’s attempt to tip the 
scales of debate in favor of incompatibilism. The challenge was to con-
struct a compatibilism persuasive enough to weaken intuitive resistance 
to the conclusion that you are responsible for your divinely caused choice. 
But the addition of any number of other elements to the history and back-
ground of the choice, if those elements are divinely caused, does nothing 
to shake the intuition that if God causes your choice, you are not respon-
sible. Both Baker and Mele grant that divine controller scenarios can be 
constructed which are sufficiently similar to their naturalist causation 
scenarios such that, if you are free and responsible in the naturalist sce-
nario, then you are free and responsible in the divine controller scenario. 
But neither succeeds in making it really plausible that you could be free 
in the divine controller scenario. I suspect that other compatibilist theo-
ries would fare the same against the divine controller argument. If the 
original intuition that you are not free and responsible when God directly 
causes your choices is as wide-spread and as powerful as I take it to be, 
then the divine controller argument is more persuasive than the tollens 
argument and provides good reason to adopt incompatibilism.42
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and causing the philosopher to present the persuasive reasons such that you are deter-
mined, by these factors, to choose to murder (or to choose to sell all you have and give to the 
poor), then it seems to me that you are not deserving of blame (or of praise). The reason we 
are not offended at the thought of “manipulation” by the eloquent philosopher is presum-
ably that we assume that his eloquence does not “induce” our desires, beliefs, and decisions 
in a way that closes off options and determines us to one choice rather than another. He is 
not really analogous to the controller in the controller argument.
42I thank the editor of this journal and anonymous referees for helpful comments which 
led to significant improvement of this paper.
